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THE  EUROPEAN  UNION:  VISION  AND  POWER 
Mr.  Rector, 
The  University of  Bonn  has  done  me  great honour  by  conferring 
upon me  the illustrious Robert  Schuman  Prize.  It is  a  prize that 
commemorates  a  very great European  statesman - a  statesman of whom 
it can  truly be  said that as  much  as  any  individual  could  be  he  was 
the  father of  the European idea. 
But no-one  knew  better than Robert  Schuman  that all  achievement 
in politics is essentially a  cooperative effort.  In receiving  this 
prize with gratitude and  a  sense of humility  I  think of all  those 
with whom  I  have worked  for  twenty  five  years  and more  on  the 
European  scene,  and in particular all those with whom  I  am  nmv 
working in helping to fashion  the attitudes  and policies  of  our 
Community  towards  the greater world outside.  There  is  no  part of my 
life's work  that  I  would rather see recognised  than  the  small  efforts 
which providence has  allowed me  to contribute  to  the  promotion of  the 
European idea. 
I  would like this  evening  to talk with  you  about  a  question which 
I  have  found myse:f confronted with at every turn in that  experience  -
the question what  sort of power  our  Community  is  and  should  seek in 
the future  to be. 
Of  course  I  recognise  that  the  language  of power is only  one  of 
many  languages  for  the discussion of politics and international 
relations.  But  at the  same  time it affords  a  way  of  speaking about 
European affairs that is realistic and at the  same  time  revealing. 
Europe lives,  and must  live in a  world  of power. 
But what sort of power must  Europe  be? 
Let us  look at the  question  from  a  philosophical  standpoint. 
The  essence of power may  be said to  be  the ability to have  your  own 
way.  In other words,  power  requires  two  elements.  In  the first 
place,  the ability to decide what  we  want.  And  in the second place 
a  range  of instruments  of sufficient dimension to put  those  policies 
into effect. 
How  able are we  to decide what  we  want?  Let  me  put it 
way  - has  Europe yet  become  a  permanent  and  enduring  fact? 
what  Robert  Schuman  and  the  other founders  of  the  Community 
think of our  achievements  in this respect. 
another 
I  wonder 
would 
They would,  I  believe,  acknowledge  that much  has  been  done. 
They would salute the achievement  of a  more  or less unified industrial 
market  and  the creation of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  with all 
that  these developments  have meant  for  the  growth  of  trade with  the 
Community.  They would salute the  achievement  of the  Customs  Union 
and  of  the  Common  Commercial  Policy.  And  they would  acknowledge  the 
ingenuity and  flexibility we  have  shown  in weaving  new  forms  of 
Community  cooperation and,  for  example,  in dealing with the  effects 
on our internal situation of  the breakdown  of the post-War 
international monetary order.  They would,  I  believe,  welcome  the 
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gradual  emergence of a  Community  presence and personality on the 
world scene,  and in particular its attitude  towards  the countries 
o.f  the Third World. 
But,  having made  these acknowledcements,  I  believe that the 
founde.rs  of the  Community would  then go on to pose some  hs.Td questions-
They would  remark,  as Mr.  Tindemans  has  remarked,  that there is ample 
evidence of the desire of the peoples of  Euro~e to make  further 
progress  together in unity. .  What,  they would ask,  are you doins 
about this in Brussels?  What  are you dOing about it in the national 
capitals? 
In these matters we  are,  I  believe,  approaching a  period of 
fundamental  choice.  Is  the European Community  to remain at the level 
of a  customs  union with a  set of limited instruments for internal 
economic  cooperat.ion - a  comnon agricultural policy and a  social 
policy and  a  regional policy of sorts - and with its external relations 
essent.ially organised around the common  commercial  policy,  together 
with a  more  or less closely coordinated system of political 
cooperation?  Or are we  to proceed beyond this  to a  fuller conception 
of European Union  - by which  I  mean  a  Union  which  provides both the 
transfer of r.e·sources  accompanied by the strict economic disciplines 
which are necessary for deeper integration,  and  the capacity actively 
to influence the world scene? 
I  do not doubt  the permane.nce  or the signiff.cance of what we 
have already achieved.  In a  number of important spheres  Europe is 
al·ready  endowed with a  formidable range of instruments  for putting 
its policie.s  into effect.  But how  real is our social,  our political, 
our moral unity?  How  enduring is our substance? 
Let us  try to be clear about why  this matters. 
In a  secular age the peoples of Europe yet continue to need the 
inspiration of a  positive vision.  At  the same  time the  form of 
society we  have created is one that can only be sustained by 
organisation.  Vision and power must go together. 
For both of these rea,sons  - both for  the sake of the vision and 
for the power  - the states of Europe have undertaken together to •eek 
ou., t  and develop  the European dimension of . their exiBtenee.  In this 
they are seeking a  way  that does  not detract from  thef.r national 
identity but wht.ch makes  it possible for them  to survive and flourish 
!n the second half of the twentieth century. 
Tbe  reality of our cont.i.nent continues  to be the revivified 
existence and identity of our nation states.  They are still in very 
large part the natural  focus  of the aspirations of our peoples  and of 
the political organisation of our Continent. 
But without the vision of European unity what future would we 
have?  The furopean idea continues  to provide the essential impulse 
to that progressive  interweav.ing of material :interests which is the 
best guarantee of the permanent Temoval of Europe's ancient 
p,sychological  barriers and of her ancestral hostilities and suspicions. 
Unless  this vision thrives the national Rrinciple - which is stfll so 
powerful  .among  us all, .somet:im.es  in new  forms  - could ,still turn 
inwards and  feed upon its own inversion. and morbidity.  And  without 
the sense of hope and the economic progress which the European idea 
provides,  the balance of the social contract upon which the internal 
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life of each  of our societies  depend would inevitably be disturbed. 
More  positively,  our hopes  of future progress  are also at stake 
in our commitment  to European unity.  The  fact is that there are 
nowadays  some  things  - some  very necessary things  - that can only be 
done if we  do  them  together. 
Unless  we  advance  together in unity we  cannot successfully pursue 
our essential interests in the world outside or fulfil  the inter-
national responsibilities which  flow  from  our history,  our experience 
and  our  economic  strength.  And  unless  we  can achieve  a  wider  and more 
profound  economic  and monetary integration we  cannot hope  to realise 
the full measure  of prosperity and social  progress  that the  European 
vision  holds  out to us. 
All  of this is as  true now  as it was  when  the  Community  was 
founded.  In answer  to the hard question of the  founders  of the 
Community  we  could,  of course,  say that it was  easier at the beginning. 
This  was  indeed the case.  As  the  French say  - nous  avons  mange  le pain 
blanc.  The  Europe  of a  quarter of  a  century ago was  devastated by war 
and  fearful  of the future.  There was  a  willingness  on  the part both 
of the  governments  and of the peoples  to make  sacrifices and  to 
respond  to the adventure  and hope  of  a  new  idea.  Never  having  been 
put  to the test, it was  also easy to assume  the validity of  a  rather 
mechanical  theory of European integration - as if the harmonisation 
of interests would necessarily lead to a  harmony  of views. 
But none  of  these perfectly valid observations  about  the past 
can remove  the challenge of continuing the building of Europe under 
the signs  of the present and  the future.  It is true that our earlier 
ideas  of integration have  turned out  to  be  too simple.  If we  are  to 
make  further progress  we  must  develop  a  more  subtle and more  organic 
analysis  on  the basis  of our experienceo  It is true that the  fears 
that attended our first steps  have  largely disappeared.  But  the facts 
that give rise to  those fears  still remain in existence - only we  must 
take  a  more  measured view  of  them.  It is  true that the  social 
realities of Europe  today are infinitely more  complex  - less malleable 
therefore  - than  they were  when  we  began.  But  by  the  same  token,  they 
are richer,  and  the means  available to us  are larger. 
As  in the  pas~so in the future,  the development  of  common 
European institutions is  the key  to our progress  together.  Above  all 
we  need  a  strong and  co~fident European political authority capable 
of expressing the  European will  and able to make  it effective.  Here 
lies  the  importance  of the  European  Council  of the  heads  of government 
of  the Member  States. 
But,  amid  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tides  of politics  and  the 
shifts of fortune which  determine  the rise and  fall  of national 
governments,  there is no substitute for  the existence of an accepted 
and established framework  of legal,  institutional and powerful 
structures whose  essential function it is  to seek only to  define  the 
European interest.  This  was  so  in the  Community  of the  Six.  It is  so 
in the  Community  of  the Nine.  And  it will  be  even more  so in a 
f~rther enlarged  Community.  The  further  development  of cooperation 
between  the Member  States is of course essential  to  the  future  of  the 
European Union.  But cooperation by itself is not  enough.  The  history 
of Europe is littered with  the wreckage of defunct coalitions.  We 
have  to maintain and strengthen that element  of obligation - the 
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pressure to reach a  conclusion in the common  interest -which marks 
the difference between a  ,c,oa.lition and a  Ct:maunity. 
In this ncthi.ng will help so much .as  the ·.new  balim!Ce .in 'CJl'lr 
a.f:fai.r:s  that will flow  from the holding of direct el:ectiOit\5 to die 
~an  Parliament.  Of cOtllrse.  nc one shoUI.d suppose that: a 
d:i.rectly elected Parliament will ·m:rendgbt prov:ide a  new pellti.cal 
authority for the Eu.r~n  Onion.  Its importance li.es• rather* 1D 
t:he  renew:ed legitimacy it.  will brlng to the obligation to develop a 
'CORl1llliGll  European policy.  'l',ogether with the Ccmrmi.;ssi.on  l.t: wUl take aa 
t:he essential functi,an of  tl:te  ,constant pr<lllmOti.on of tim lEu~ 
interest 'which is neither  t.he highest COl!lDOn  factor nor t:be lowest 
·common  denominator of the various  nati.'Dl!Mll  interests. 
For Europe will  turn out  t:o  be a  hollow Titan if we  are un-
willing to make  some s.acrifices of natioaal int:erest:s  - interests that 
often appear to be more immedi·ate but wh.ich eannot outweigh the 
ultimate advantages of pu:rsuing :the c~  i:nt:e:t:'eSt.  We  camnot: afford 
the schizophrenia which wills tbe European end but which shi.es aill1?l 
from supplying the means.  or whic.b 'Wants 'Europe t·o  succeed btlt ·waDb 
it only to succeed in one particular aati.oaal way.  Our European 
cOl'llmi tment must of ,ecurse, be n:ourisbed by the visible si.gns of i.ts 
capacity to satisfy national interests.  But  Ln  turn it :must also be 
fed by its willingness  to ask at every point and in re,l.ati·on to every 
problem,  where lies the European interest and what ean we do to 
promote it? 
* 
*  * 
If the first prerequi·site of pG'l!Wer  is the capacity to define 
interests an<i  poli·cie.s,  the second is the possessi.on 'O.f  t:he aeans 
o:f  pursuing them and the wi:ll  t~o use them.  It is here that: we  fiDd 
the answer  to the question what sort of power Europe is and must be. 
At its present: stage of dewelopment:.,  the ~an  Comaunity .is 
essentially a  ncivilian'>t power.,  represent·i..n.g a  .new  f,ona of i:oter-
national political life. 
'Ihe  instn.:ments of power have traditionally been graded into a 
hierarchy defined by an assessment of their relative potency. 
Hi.litary power is conventionally put at:  tbe top end of the  scale~ so 
that:,  .for example.,  the concept of a  Super-Power is defined i:n 'terms 
of the possession of a  certai:n assured nuclear fi.re-power.  EcOOOflDlc 
and ccmmercial  power and influeoce coo:venti<J!:la.lly occupy the middle 
range of the scale.  And .at the bot:t0111t  there i.s the influence that 
.fl·ows  fron'l  moral  example  and  fr01!1il  what:  the French ·call the ra:fQI'D(!'!!!,!!t 
of culture and the spirit.  ·· 
But  this is of c-ourse  a  purely t:radi.tiotlal account o£ power - an 
account which is premised upcm the  a:SSUlll!lption that ai.l.i.tary power can 
still be brought to bear dire1ctly and  that: war is st:illa  to paraphrase 
Clau:s~it:z,  a  possible and rational extension of policy by other 
1'1!1Jf!a;ns. 
Clearly,  the emergence of t:he nuclear balance of terror bas by 
no means  :nullified the  imp·ortance 'Of military .inst~ts - not least 
in those .areas where  the Super-Powers  do not face ooe another 
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directly.  We  have  always  to  be  prepared to meet  force  applied in 
new  forms  or by proxy.  And  the preservation of deterrence i" the 
central balance  between East  and West still remains  a  supremely 
necessary safeguard both against  the use of military power  and 
against  the threat that it might  be used. 
But with  the  important -nay vital  - proviso  that these 
conditions  are met,  then surely Churchill was  right when  he  argued 
in 1954  that we  may  "look to  the universality of potential 
destruction with hope  and even with confidence".  Outside Western 
Europe  this  has  proved  to be  the case  over  the past three decades  -
with certain exceptions  which  have happily been limited in their 
effects.  In  the  new  international situation created by  the nuclear 
balance  - and  by  the nuclear shield afforded us  by  the United States  -
it has  been possible for  the European  Community  to  emerge  as  a 
significant force  in world affairs although an essentially "civilian" 
power whose  strength in no  way  derives  from its military capabilities. 
Our  power  resides  not in the arts  of war,  but in the arts  of peace. 
So  long as  the nuclear balance  of potential horrific 
destruction subsists  - so  long,  that is,  as  America's military 
partnership with Europe  continues  to  be  seen by  the United  States  as 
being in the American interest,  which  I  might  add,  in turn presupposes 
a  generous  contribution from  European countries  to  our  own  defence  -
so  long  as  all this  endures,  then we  can look  to  our  "civilian" power 
to exert great influence. 
Indeed we  might  go  so far  as  to say that so  long as  deterrence 
secures  the essential  framework  of world security it will  be  by  the 
exercise of  the arts of peace  and not  by  the arts of war  that the 
pattern of  the  future will  be decided.  Consider  the increasing 
preponderance  of economic  questions  on  the  agenda  of world politics 
today.  These  questions will  be  decided by  the relative productive 
power  of our economies,  by  their capacity to sustain a  rapid and 
steady growth of international  trade and  investment,  and  by  the  degree 
of regard and  respect  accorded  to our attitudes  and  actions  towards 
the developing world  and  to our social  traditions  and  the values  which 
they express.  Only  those who  have  no  confidence in the capacity of 
their social  and political  systems  to pursue effectively the arts  of 
peace will  turn instead to  the use or the threat of military power. 
Of  course,  as  the Belgian Prime Minister,  Mr  Tindemans,  said in 
his  recent Report,  the emerging  European Union nrust  in due  course see 
to it that it makes  a  distinctive contribution to the assurance of 
its  own  security.  This  must  be within the  framework  of the Atlantic 
Alliance,  which  already provides  the  foundation of the  security of 
each and all of us.  But  for  the present  and  for  the near future,  the 
chief instruments  of which  the European  Community  disposes in its 
external  relations lie in the  sphere  of  economics  and in the sphere 
of  the spirit - that is, in those fields  of action which  have  acquired 
a  new  and  special  importance in the international relations of  the 
world  today. 
*  *  ·k 
In these areas  the  Community's  interests  and  concerns  are more 
than merely regional  or local.  They  are world-wide,  and  there is  no 
question but  that  Europe  bulks  large in all matters  connected with 
them.  This  is  more  particularly so  since  the  Comnrunity's  enlargement 
three  years  ago,  which  marked  not  only  a  quantitative but  also  a 
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qualitative change in Europe's external relations. 
The  Community  of the Nine  now  has  a  gross  national product 
which  does not fall far short of that of the United States and which 
considerably exceeds  that of the Soviet Union,  or that of China or 
Japan.  Its population is larger than that of either the United States 
or of  the Soviet Union,  and its production of many  key manufactures 1s 
second to none.  It is also  one  of the world's chief food-growing 
areas.  Our Member  States  together transact some  40  per cent of the 
free world's  trade,  fully half of which is with countries outside the 
Community's  borders,  and  they hold some  30 per cent of the world's 
currency reserves.  They  are  the source of nearly half of official 
development assistance to  the Third World,  and  they provide a  large 
proportion of the private investment and new  technology by which  the 
developing countries set such store.  To  many  nations,  both developing 
and developed,  both within the free world  economic  systems  and  among 
the state-trading countries,  the  Community  ranks  among  their most 
important markets  for  raw materials,  for  food  and for industrial  g.oods. 
When  these economic characteristics are viewed as  power  factors  .... 
that is,  as  factors  that affect the  Community's  role and  influence in 
the world - they present indeed a  picture of worldwide  significance, 
They  present also a  picture both of formidable  strength and  of 
formidable vulnerability  • 
.. On  the assets side,  the Community's  policies governing access  to 
its markets  and  the provision of finance  and  development  aid and the 
transfer of technology  have  a  significant impact upon the  economic 
prospects  of our industrialised partners.  And  they have  a  decisive 
effect upon  the  economic  outlook in many  developing countries  through  .. 
out  the world  and  especially upon  those who  are historically or 
geographically closest to us. 
On  the debit side,  as  an  economy  that largely lives  by  industry 
and trade,  the  Community  is vulnerable to the market  access  and 
monetary policies of all its trading and financial  partners, 
especially of the United States  and Japan.  And  it is notably 
vulnerable to interference with its imports  of energy  and  raw 
materials. 
So  the  Community's  power is wrapped up in a  web  of internati·onal 
inter-dependencies.  There is  a  striking paradox here.  Our  power is 
in large part a  product  of that·specialisation of  economic  functions 
out  of which  the web  of  inter-dependence is woven.  And  yet at the 
same  time it is a  power  that is strongly qualified by  the very 
interdependence that makes  it possible.  The  resolution of this 
paradox lies in our acceptance,  together with our partners,  of  an 
ever-increasing measure  of common  multilateral discipline.  These 
constraints are the condition of the further economic  progress  of all 
of us.  They  are also constraints  that bind us all.  Yet  at the same 
time in the determination of their specific character,_  there is ample 
scope for  the exercise of those  forms  of power  and influence that are 
the Community's  most valuable  and in some  ways  unique asset. 
Meanwhile,  the essential fact that underlies  the relationship 
between  the  European Cormnunity  and its principal partners in the 
industrialised world and  among  the developing countries is that it 
is an essentially interdependent relationship.  What  damages  any  011e 
of us must  damage  the others.  And,  with respect to the United States 
in particular our  economies,  our political structure,  our way  of life 
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and ultimately our ability to pursue our  own  destiny as  free 
societies are all ultimately and intimately interwoven. 
What  is true for the economic  sphere is true also for  the 
realm of  the spirit.  Here  too  our Europe  bulks  large,  and  our 
economic  interdependence is paralleled by  the growth  of an  ever 
more  densely woven web  of contacts  and communications  across  the 
old barriers of geography,  race,  creed and culture. 
Within  the  Community  our societies are passing  through  a  period 
of  ferment  and  turmoil.  But  the  ferment  has  been  one  of change  and 
striving,  not  one  of decay and decline.  Our  Europe  retains  her old 
enchantments,  but  she has  put  the nightmares  of the past behind her. 
Both at horne  and in her relations with the world outside  - especially 
in her relations with the former  colonial  peoples  - she  has  learned 
the wisdom of Meister Eckhart's  saying,  that "only  the hand  that 
erases  can write the  true thing". 
The  dynamism  of Western Europe's  recovery since  the war  has  been 
the admiration of those who  wish us  well  and  the puzzlement  of those 
who  do not.  The  solidity of the democratic  order and  the  cohesion we 
have created within the  Community  is  a  pole of attraction for  the 
constructive forces  in many  lands.  The  progress  of  our experiments  in 
unity is studied with  a  zeal  for  emulation as  far afield as  South East 
Asia  and Latin America.  And  our  quest  for  a  synthesis  that reconciles 
tradition with innovation is a  mirror which many  ancient peoples  hold 
up  to glimpse  their own  soul  as  they undergo  a  similar ferment  of 
change. 
But let us  not forget  that there is undoubtedly also a  sense in 
which  Europe's  own  psychological  growth is  bound up with her relations 
with the peoples  of  the world outside Europe  - a  sense in which  the 
emergence  and  formation  of our  own  personality is  bound up with the 
development  of theirs.  The  effects  of this  on  both sides  belong to 
that class  of social  phenomena  that is both profound and intangible. 
In  the  interdependence in the  realm of the spirit which  flows  from it 
are  to  be  found  the  foundations  of that influence without arrogance 
that is perhaps  the most  striking feature  of Europe's  present position 
in the world.  And  at this  deep  level we  find  the moral  and 
psychological  foundation  of Europe's  place as  a  "civilian" power  vJith 
a  world role. 
That  role will not  and  cannot  be  the  role of  any  one  of  our 
nations writ large. 
Each  of our c9untries  has  its own  tradition in foreign policy  -
a  tradition which  is  the  compound  expression of its national  history 
and culture and of  a  continuously reviewed assessment  of  the  enduring 
national interest amid  the  flux of world events.  The  foreign policy 
of the  European Union will also gradually take  shape  in its own 
tradition.  But  although this  tradition will  be moulded  by  the  same 
considerations  which  have  shaped  our national  policies,  it will 
inevitably reflect a  synthesis  of all  the historical  elements  and 
abiding interests that go  to make  up  our  Community.  Indeed,  it will 
be more  even  than  a  synthesis: it will  be  something  quite  new  and 
different,  reflecting the  emergence  of  a  quite  new  and different 
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factor - the European factor - in world affairs. 
It will be  a  poli.cy which project.s the essential character 
and interests of European soci.ety,  catl'Di..tted. to plura1ism,  ~racy. 
and the socf.al-mark.et economy.  It wil.l  therefore join us in cl.ose 
ties with like-minded countries all over the world~ and notably with 
the United States.  It wi..ll  al.so  be  a  pol.i.cy which refl.ects Ebrope
11s 
hist:or:ic c:oncern with the developing wm:ld,.  and the various  el.e5'11eDn 
of which that concem i.s  made up - humanitarianism"  zeal  to· spread 
l'DOre  widely the  food of the human spirit,. the desi.re to do  busimes-s 
with a  sense of responsibility.  It will reflect the hi_stori.ca1 ties 
of kinship  and the mutual  int.erests which bind Great Britain t:o the 
Commonwealth,  and the cultural bonds whlch  join France and Italy to 
the other countries of the Mediterranean border-land and  tEl' Africa as 
well as  those which  join nenmark with the other Scandinavian counttlri..es 
and the  German Federal. Republic with its compatriots  and neighbours;  t:o 
t:he:  East. 
All a.f these hist.oric  elements will find thei.r place in Ettirope  rs; 
e~ernal relations.  Bu:t  they will not do so in the forms  they have 
taken in the past,. nor can they continue ta be defined exclusi:"rely by 
one or other national. connection.  Further,  Europe will be  chall~tf 
tiD>  fresh creativity as new  subjects.  t:ake. theix pl.ace on  the agenda of 
international relations,  as  nev.r  pre-occopat:ions emerge and new 
instruments  of international policy are forg,ed  •. 
Could we  find a  greater or more. worth-Wile challengeZ' 
Especially at this  time, when all our socie.t:ies· are in such desperate 
n:eerl  of  a  fresh and morally satisfying sense of purpose..  Bi:J.t  it is a 
c:ha:llenge which we  can only meet: by conscious  and cans tant effort  .. 
0\m:  attitudes will need to undergo  a  sea~changec.  We  wi.ll neecis in 
sho.rt~  to put Europe  first,  and t:o  give the Ell.l:rop,ean  interest the: 
highest priori.ty. 
I  have  the feeling that if our  Governments  were pre'fla:red t:o  lead, 
our peoples will s:till gladly  foilat.r - despite all the disii.lusi.on: 
t:hey  may  feel at the  recent slow progress of the European idea. 
In all t:hi.s  we wi.l.l  f.ind no  bet:t.er i:nspiratian than  t:h.:H.:  of 
Robert  SChuman.  He  knew  full well that politics i.s  the art of the 
possible.  But he  also  knew  t:hat the  task af: the  statesman: :iis  tc 
make poss.ihle that which is nec:.essary.  And we wi.ll not find a 
sounder principle of action than the advice of Bismark th'Cf.t  in 
pal.i:t.ies we must be gp;i.ded not by what we  thi.nk we can do,,  but by 
what we  know w.e  mus. t  da. 